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This monograph investigates the role of the electricity market in the allocation of water 
and other resources used as inputs into electricity generation. We base our observations 
on the outputs of an original electricity spot market model designed to mimic the 
New Zealand electricity market. The model explains the role of water storage and the 
associated value of water in decision-making by generation companies. It also explains 
how water is allocated between on and off-peak periods and across seasons.
We explore the link between the spot and hedge markets, and examine how spot 
prices are translated into hedge and consumer prices. We then look at how various 
electricity infrastructure and climatic changes affect reservoir inflow characteristics, and 
the way these influence decision-making in the spot and hedge markets and thereby 
affect electricity prices. We discuss the social value of water in the electricity market and 
the wider economy.
1 Introduction
“If it weren’t for electricity, we’d all be watching television  
by candlelight.”
George Gobel, American comedian.
A world without electricity is unimaginable to 
most New Zealanders. Although not a necessity 
in the same way as food and shelter, electricity 
powers our lights, computers, phones and yes, 
our televisions. Yet despite the importance of 
electricity in our daily lives, many people would 
draw a blank if asked to describe how it comes 
into our homes and workplaces.
In New Zealand electricity is generated 
mostly from natural resources such as water, gas, 
geothermal heat, coal and wind. Hydropower 
makes up the bulk of production, providing 57.6% 
of all electricity generation in 2011.3 However, 
water is a scarce resource and only one of several 
possible inputs into the electricity generation 
process. the question arises, therefore, as to 
whether water is being put to its most efficient 
use in electricity.
In this monograph we examine the role of the 
electricity market in the efficient allocation of water 
and other resources. We base our observations 
on the results of an original model of the spot 
market,4 although the ambit of the monograph 
extends beyond the model. the monograph may 
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5 lewis Evans and Richard 
Meade (2005) Alternating 
Currents or Counter-
Revolution? Contemporary 
Electricity Reform in New 
Zealand. Wellington: Victoria 
University Press. Accessed 
at http:// www.iscr.org.
nz/f310,8474/Alternating_
Currents_e-book.pdf.
6 Daily temperature is a 
significant determinant of 
demand.
7 Hedge prices may be agreed 
for periods as long as ten years 
or as short as a day. Commonly 
in New Zealand, they last for 
three months.
be viewed as adding to the work of Evans and 
Meade (2005), who described and appraised 
the New Zealand electricity market from 1985 to 
2005.5
1.1  Resource allocation – 
how does it work?
the need to allocate resources efficiently is 
encapsulated in a well-worn but apt saying: “there 
is no such thing as a free lunch.” In other words, 
resources are scarce relative to the countless uses 
to which they could be applied. A resource is 
efficiently allocated when it goes to its socially most 
highly valued use. this involves asking, among 
other things, what is this use, how much of the 
resource is used, and when the resource should be 
used. Where the resource is not initially owned by 
the person who will put it to its most efficient use, it 
may be traded until it moves to that person.
Commodities such as electricity are generally 
traded in complementary spot and hedge 
markets. the spot price is what the buyer pays for 
the commodity’s immediate or near-immediate 
delivery. the hedge price is negotiated by 
contracting parties for the exchange of the 
commodity at points in the future. Since hedge 
contracts typically involve a fixed price and 
quantity they reduce risk and enable planning and 
investment. Nonetheless, spot markets perform a 
crucial gap-filling role: they enable mismatches 
between supply and demand of amounts hedged 
to be met by spot market trading, at the times the 
mismatches occur. Such mismatches are common 
in commodity markets, where supply and demand 
tend to be quite unpredictable. they can arise in 
the electricity context as hydro generators try to 
manage variations in water availability.
Electricity has unusual physical properties 
which differentiate it from other commodities. 
It is a homogenous good – when transmitted, it 
is impossible to determine which generator has 
supplied which quantity. Additionally, although 
its inputs such as water and gas are storable, it is 
not economically feasible to store electricity itself. 
this creates unique logistical issues since demand 
for electricity is continuous and supply must match 
demand at every instant in time. Fortunately, the 
electricity network and the smooth operation of 
the electricity hedge and spot markets ensure that 
you can watch all the Harry Potter films in a row, 
uninterrupted.
Because of electricity’s physical traits, the 
relationship between electricity hedge and spot 
markets is a unique one. In many commodity 
markets, the commodity can be stored and this 
produces relationships between its hedge and 
spot prices. However, an electricity generator 
cannot store electricity for transmission at a later 
date if, for example, the current spot price is high 
but the hedge price is low. that said, there is still 
a relationship between the two prices. Spot price 
volatility incentivises signing up for hedges, but 
once hedged for a quantity of electricity, that 
quantity is essentially removed from the spot 
market.
the electricity spot price is determined by a 
multitude of factors, which include past and 
current water inflow levels, water storage, short 
term supply and demand6 and transmission 
events. Market participants use hedge contracts 
to reduce future spot market risk,7 and so the 
hedge price derives from expected spot price 
characteristics in the future. the hedge price 
reached today then affects the wholesale rates 
used to set consumer prices over the period of the 
hedge.
Generators (sellers) and retailers (buyers) 
manage risk by entering into hedge contracts 
with each other. these fix the price for a quantity 
of electricity traded. Vertical integration (or 
gentailing) is another way to manage risk. It allows 
generators to trade internally between generation 
and retail arms, and then sell fixed price contracts 
directly to end consumers through the retail arm.
Generators are required to sell electricity in 
the New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM), a 
wholesale spot market. Each trading period in the 
NZEM lasts half an hour. Given the volatility of the 
spot market and resultant hedge arrangements 
(which may be by contract or vertical integration), 
only around 20% of wholesale electricity 
transactions are carried out at the spot price. the 
remainder are priced at some hedge price.
1.2 Off to the electricity market
Our paper focuses on how different factors 
affect the allocation of water in the New Zealand 
electricity market. these factors include the 
the electricity 
spot price is 
determined by 
a multitude of 
factors, which 
include past 
and current 
water inflow 
levels, water 
storage, short 
term supply and 
demand and 
transmission 
events.
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Figure 1.1 From plant to end user8
Households and 
businesses
8 this figure omits the trading 
platform (i.e. the transmission 
grid) and the few large 
industrial users that purchase 
directly from generators or run 
their own generation. these 
users are not the focus of this 
paper.
availability of water storage, the price of water 
and state of the climate. to explore all of this, we 
require a working market model which mimics 
generator and demand decisions as observed in 
New Zealand.
Models are simplified representations of 
reality. An effective model is like a judicious 
gardener – it clears away extraneous detail 
to reveal what we care about. Many market 
participants use their own models to guide their 
bidding, offering and investment choices. We 
use a simplified model that encapsulates the 
efficient use of water storage, hydro and non-
hydro generation and daily and seasonal patterns 
of demand. Our model allows for climate change 
through variation in the water inflows that are the 
inputs into the hydro generation process. this 
allows our model to show credibly how climate 
change affects electricity spot prices.
Before introducing our market model, we first 
examine the concept of water inflows. Second, 
we then examine the model and the outcomes 
it produces. third, we explore how climate 
change may affect generation policies and what 
this means for both the spot and hedge markets. 
Fourth, we discuss the allocation of water in the 
wider New Zealand economy. Finally, we draw 
some conclusions from our observations.
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9 NIWA (20 December 2011) 
“New Zealand’s rain falls mainly 
in the mountains”, NIWA. 
Accessed 12 March 2013 at 
http://www.niwa.co.nz/news/
new-zealand%E2%80%99s-rain-
falls-mainly-in-the-mountains.
10  Matt McGlone (13 July 2012) 
“Ecoregions – Central Otago” 
te Ara – the Encyclopaedia 
of New Zealand. Accessed 12 
March 2013 at http://www.
teara.govt.nz/en/ecoregions/
page-8 =.
11 Rainfall may vary over the 
years due to systematic climate 
fluctuations such as El Niño and 
la Niña. See: Reid Basher, Brett 
Mullan, Jim Renwick and David 
Wratt, “El Niño and Climate 
Forecasting,” NIWA. Accessed 
12 March 2013 at http://
www.niwa.co.nz/our-science/
climate/information-and-
resources/clivar/elnino.
12 that said, there is increasing 
demand in summer for air 
conditioning.
13 the generator also has the 
option of spilling inflows, but 
this is not commonly exercised.
14 Photo taken in December 
2012.
2 Inflows: now and in the future
The Clyde River dam in summer – store or run?14
In New Zealand electricity generation begins 
with nature. Nature affects both demand and 
supply of electricity. On the supply side, nature 
provides inputs into the generation process by 
rain, snowmelt, rivers and lakes, natural gas, 
wind and so forth. On the demand side, changing 
temperatures guide our use of electricity-
consuming appliances such as heaters and air 
conditioners. this monograph concentrates on 
changes to the supply-side effects of nature.
New Zealand is comparatively abundant in 
rainfall and natural water resources. However, 
these are unevenly distributed throughout the 
country. For example, the Cleddau Valley near 
Milford Sound is one of the wettest places in the 
world, with approximately 13.4 metres of average 
annual rainfall.9 In comparison, the interior valleys 
of Central Otago see less than 600 millimetres 
of annual rainfall.10 Rainfall also varies greatly 
not only between regions, but over time – both 
seasonally and over the years.11
Hydro generators use water as their 
renewable ‘fuel’ and are subject to all of its 
natural variations. It is beneficial for generators 
to manage this variation, and they do so through 
water storage. the fluctuating availability of water 
affects generators’ decisions to offer to generate 
electricity in the spot market, and the resultant 
spot electricity price.
the term ‘inflow’ refers to water that flows into 
hydro reservoirs. Inflows fluctuate in the short-
term and vary with factors such as the level of rain 
or snowmelt, but they do follow general seasonal 
trends: they are generally highest during early 
summer when the winter snow melts. Conversely, 
demand for electricity tends to peak in winter as 
the nation collectively braves the cold.12
the discrepancy between electricity demand 
and inflow levels gives rise to the all-important 
question for hydro-generators: should I run water 
through the dynamos today, or store it away for 
use tomorrow?13 Since river flows are continuous, 
generators face this question in each half-hour 
trading period. Where inflows are not immediately 
used in generation, they can be stored in hydro 
lakes (reservoirs) until needed. Reservoirs have 
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15 However, long term pricing 
does not affect the short term.
16 the state of water storage, 
climate and demand across 
the country are well known 
by market participants at 
points in time, although other 
factors, such as the supply 
and price of gas, may not be. 
Some generators may be in a 
different storage position and 
make different choices. 
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Figure 2.1 Monthly inflows in 2006
only a very small potential effect on the annual 
amount of water available for hydro generation. 
Nonetheless, they fulfil the key function of shifting 
the availability of water between time periods, 
which we delve into later. 
2.1 Predicting inflows
Hydro generators predict future inflow levels 
to guide their decisions on whether to store or 
generate. this affects their offering decisions 
in the markets and hence has implications for 
electricity prices, the generation policies of non-
hydro generators and social welfare (i.e. good 
economic performance). to aid prediction, hydro 
generators look to both past and current inflow 
levels.
Inflows may be measured either in the short 
or long term. Short-term inflows may relate to 
periods as short as a single trading period. they 
are most relevant in the spot market, which re-
flects characteristics of inflows in the very short 
term. long term inflows, on the other hand, 
relate to a window of time in the distant future 
(e.g. a year). they provide information about the 
performance expected of the spot market in the 
distant future and consequently are more relevant 
for hedge pricing.15
Different time periods call for different 
approaches to prediction. the further a market 
participant wants to forecast into the future, the 
less useful immediate past inflow figures are. For 
example, if someone wanted to forecast October 
2014 inflows, knowledge of June 2013 inflows 
would provide no assistance. However, the latter 
figure would be of assistance in forecasting July 
2013 inflows. Having said that, seasonal patterns 
assist in forecasting each season’s inflows in the 
short and long term, and hence knowledge of 
October 2013 inflows would be of some help in 
forecasting October 2014 inflows.
2.2 Inflows in the near future
In the short term, inflows are related over time and, 
while they fluctuate, they follow a general pattern. 
Unusually high or low inflows eventually return to 
average levels. With this in mind generators are 
able to predict with a modicum of confidence 
inflow levels in the near future. Generators are 
also aware of four other key pieces of information 
useful in making generation decisions: the season, 
the state of the electricity market, past inflows 
and prices, current inflows and the level of water 
storage.
If long term inflows are thought of as a cake, 
then short term inflows are the slices. Figure 2.1 
above illustrates such a slice of time.
let us take the case of a manager of a hydro 
plant. It is early March, and inflow levels are 
remarkably low for the time of year. Is it better to 
conserve water rather than generate electricity? 
Not necessarily, because stored water is available. 
Furthermore, the manager is aware of the general 
pattern of inflows over time, and that inflow levels 
are likely to rise and return to their norm within 
the next month or so. the manager will choose to 
run water through the dynamos today, knowing 
it is probable that the reservoirs will later be 
replenished.
the story ends well, as she offers to supply 
a greater quantity of electricity at any given price 
to the spot market than would otherwise be the 
case. Other hydro generators, having similar 
information and being in the same position, 
respond in a like manner.16 this has a downward 
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17  the demand, supply and 
terms of long term hedges will 
be affected by participants’ 
expectations of the level 
and variation of future spot 
prices, which are in turn 
affected by the characteristics 
of inflows and other market 
characteristics.
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Figure 2.2 Monthly Flows 1931 – 2006 (GWHrs) Average = 25.00
effect on the spot price, and leads us to the lesson 
of the story – inflow predictions in the short term 
are a determinant of the spot price.
2.3 Inflows in the distant future
the aim of predicting inflows over the long term 
is to assess the level and variation of the future 
spot price in order to inform long term pricing, 
such as those negotiated in hedge contracts. 
Generators and retailers enter long term contracts 
with the object of risk management – that is, to 
protect themselves from fluctuating prices in 
the spot market. Expected future spot prices are 
therefore one determinant of long term prices 
(and by extension, the retail prices charged to end 
consumers).
long term predictions are not assisted 
by knowledge of past and current inflow 
characteristics, as described earlier, although 
seasonal patterns are useful. this is because 
unusual short term inflows tend to return to their 
average levels. Inflows during the distant future 
are independent of one another; rain today 
suggests rain tomorrow, but says little about rain 
in a year’s time.
Figure 2.2 illustrates inflow levels over more 
than seventy years. In hedge pricing, parties 
will take the prices associated with the average 
level of inflows over the long term, adjusted for 
the season and for demand patterns. those who 
are considering entry into a hedge contract are 
primarily interested in a ‘safe’ price over the life 
of the contract, not day-to-day shifts in prices 
resulting from recent inflow levels and other 
factors. Generators want higher contractual prices 
while retailers want lower ones, and they bargain 
with each other until a mutually acceptable price 
is reached.17
the importance of inflow predictions and 
forward-looking behaviour cannot be under-
estimated. the expected level of future inflows 
affects how generators make offering decisions 
today. As touched on earlier, inflows are a product 
of nature, and climate change has the power to 
alter both the long and short term characteristics 
of inflows – and hence future spot prices and 
hedge prices that are agreed upon today. 
With an understanding of inflows and how 
hydro generators operate, we can now turn to 
consider the spot market.
... inflows are 
a product of 
nature, and 
climate change 
has the power 
to alter both 
the long and 
short term 
characteristics 
of inflows ...
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18 the 2007 processes give us 
the marginal cost curves that 
we will shortly encounter. We 
have an equation that estimates 
the process by which inflows 
evolve over time, allowing us to 
predict inflows in each period.
19 All generators are required 
to offer physical flows of 
electricity into the gross pool. 
they are free to enter financial 
hedge contracts with any party.
20 In fact, there is a market-
clearing price at each of 
approximately 250 nodes 
(markets). Where there is one 
market, the price levels across 
these nodes (i.e. regions) 
vary together. this was found 
to be the case for NZEM at 
least up to 2008 (lewis Evans, 
Graeme Guthrie and Steen 
Videbeck (2007), “Assessing 
the Integration of Electricity 
Markets using Principal 
Component Analysis: Network 
and Market Structure Effects”, 
Contemporary Economic Policy 
26(1), at 144-161).
21 We shall see below the specific 
shape of the electricity supply 
curve.
3 the spot market
Figure 3.1 Generic commodity market
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Our model encapsulates a competitive New 
Zealand electricity spot market. the model is set 
in continuous time, since rivers flow continuously 
and the supply of electricity must equal demand at 
each instant in time. We have calibrated our model 
to the 2007 New Zealand electricity market.18
Importantly, our model has a forward looking 
approach. It recognises that generators face risk 
and uncertainty in the future, and use past and 
current information to reduce this risk and assist 
generation decision-making. 
We will first look at different elements of 
the model, including how the NZEM functions 
and particular aspects of hydro and non-hydro 
generation, before examining the model as a 
whole. Once we are familiar with the model, we 
will indicate how we use it to predict how gener-
ators respond to different situations, including 
the availability of hydro storage, the relaxation 
of capacity constraints and climate change. the 
choices that generators make affect electricity 
prices and quantities, the composition of fuels 
used in generation, and the price of water.
the New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM) 
functions as a gross (or compulsory) spot market, 
overseen by a central operator.19 In every trading 
period each generator and retailer effectively 
provides the operator with its supply or demand 
curve. the operator pools the curves together 
to derive total demand and supply, from which a 
market clearing price20 and quantity are obtained.
3.1  The generic market model
the generic economic market model is an abstract 
representation of any market. It is useful to aid 
discussion of the model framework and key 
assumptions before incorporating more realistic, 
explicit and necessarily complicating features. 
Figure 3.1 below depicts the market for each 
trading period:
A (total or market) supply curve details how 
much of a commodity producers will supply at 
different prices.21 the (total or market) demand 
curve gives the quantity demanded by consumers. 
Where the curves intersect, quantity demand 
equals quantity supplied (q*). In continuously 
operating spot markets such as that for electricity, 
such market clearance occurs at each instant in 
time.
the entire shaded area gives the total welfare 
(or as economists call it, surplus) that results from 
market clearance. Producer welfare is the benefit 
to producers of having received a higher price 
than what they would have accepted. A producer 
at the bottom of the curve still receives p*. 
Consumer welfare, in the same vein, is the benefit 
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22 A perfectly competitive 
market is one with many small 
competitors, who are price 
takers. In fact, all electricity 
markets are oligopolies and 
New Zealand is no different. 
If the market is workably 
competitive (the practical 
representation of a competitive 
market), it will yield efficient 
outcomes. there are various 
definitions of a workably 
competitive market. this 
includes one where there 
may be some monopolistic 
competition, but with sufficient 
competition to preclude 
monopolistic abuse of market 
participants.
23 Marginality is a concept readily 
encountered in daily life, 
and refers to the next unit of 
a thing. Suppose you were 
forced to eat tiramisu. ‘Forced’ 
may be the wrong word 
when you are eating the first 
couple of slices, but probably 
appropriate by the time you get 
to the fifth slice. the marginal 
benefit of eating tiramisu is 
decreasing; each extra slice 
yields you less utility.
24 Competitive generators 
choosing their own generation 
policies while striving to 
maximise profits in a workably 
competitive market produce, 
approximately, the market 
outcomes the social planner 
would choose. to read more 
about this, see: Evans and 
Meade (2005) op. cit.
Consumer
Climate
Inflow
Spot Market
Gas Plant Hydro Plant
Generate
Reservoir
Spill
Store
Figure 3.2 Climate to consumer: the market model
future
future
to consumers of having paid less than what they 
were willing to for the commodity. the total sum 
of producer and consumer welfare is the measure 
of efficiency: the price level at p* maximises 
efficiency at that point in time.
Producer welfare benefits fall on the various 
parties and determines the rents of scarce 
resources. In the case of electricity in New Zealand, 
much of the producer welfare is reflected in the 
value of water in each trading period. the welfare 
is mostly held by the government, as owner of 
hydro generators and tax collector in general. 
this generic model captures the heart of any 
market, but does not explain the idiosyncrasies 
of the NZEM which make it so remarkable. As in 
the generic model of Figure 3.1, which assumes 
perfect competition,22 all generators who ‘bid’ 
to produce in a given trading period receive the 
same price. the market uses up the cheapest 
generation first, and then sets the price at p*, the 
marginal cost of the most expensive plant used 
(the marginal decision-making plant).
We focus on the supply side of NZEM. 
this is essentially a multi-competitor world, as 
encapsulated in Figure 3.2, with competition 
among and between hydro and non-hydro gas 
generators. Our model uses gas as a label for all 
non-hydro generation. Although electricity can be 
generated in a variety of ways, the label is useful 
since it is typically a gas plant that is the marginal23 
decision-making plant, and gas substitutes for 
hydro generation.
We are interested in the outcomes reached in 
a workably competitive market, but for simplicity 
our model is solved as if by a social planner 
to approximate this outcome. In the case of a 
workably competitive market, generators are 
each able to make their own generation choices. 
this is a result mimicked by the social planner.24 
the planner approach is computationally simpler 
in a model.
the social planner’s problem follows: it must 
decide how much hydro and gas generation to 
operate, given its objective of maximising welfare 
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25 the foresight of the market 
(social planner) is a source 
of dynamic efficiency that 
includes per-period efficiency 
assessed over time into the 
foreseeable future. 
26 South Island reservoirs alone 
contain about 85% of New 
Zealand’s total hydro storage 
capacity. transpower “Hydro 
Generation” transpower: 
System Operator. Accessed 12 
March 2013 at http://www.
systemoperator.co.nz/hydro-
status.
27 Investment in infrastructure 
is an important component of 
dynamic efficiency, which is 
achieved by efficient outcomes 
over the long run. Dynamic 
efficiency is to be contrasted 
with static efficiency, a more 
short-sighted approach 
which does not account 
for investment, innovation, 
education and so on. 
28 In fact, in a workably 
competitive market it is 
expected that offers will 
be close rather than equal 
to marginal cost. Offers to 
generate are affected by risk 
and hedges, as we shall discuss 
later. 
29 the supply curve of the 
model is for all non-hydro 
generation. It is termed ‘gas 
marginal cost’ because gas 
generation is discretionary and 
competes with hydro directly 
at the margin. Base load plants 
(e.g. geothermal and wind 
generation) do not.  
Figure 3.3 The marginal cost of gas generation
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into the foreseeable future.25 to choose the 
optimal policy the social planner must acknowl-
edge that all generators face cost and capacity 
constraints. Both gas and hydro generators are 
limited in plant capacity. Hydro generators may 
shift production between time periods by storing 
inflows for later production, though storage 
capacity and actual level of inflows place limit-
ations on this inter-temporal substitution.
Hydro and gas generators also face different 
cost structures. In our model there will always be 
some gas generation because we assume that gas 
plants are situated closer to consumers, so the 
cost of electricity transmission is cheaper for gas 
generators than for hydro. Although the balance 
between demand and supply in the North and 
South islands is constantly changing, most hydro 
plants are located in the South Island,26 whereas the 
bulk of electricity demand comes from the North. 
We assume that hydro generators benefit 
from zero running or reservoir costs. Alterna-
tively, these are fixed costs and do not vary 
with the level of generation. We assume fixed 
storage capacity in our model; and it takes the 
infrastructure of the market as given. there is 
no investment in either new or existing plants or 
reservoirs. the model can, however, tell us how 
to value more or less investment that relaxes 
these constraints.27
In the electricity market marginal cost curves 
function as supply curves. this is because each 
generator’s spot market offers are affected by 
the offers of other generators, and so each has an 
incentive to offer in at the lowest possible price 
(i.e. the marginal cost).28 It is therefore worth going 
into the different marginal cost structures faced 
by hydro and gas generators in more depth.
3.2 The marginal cost of gas
Gas generators face increasing marginal costs 
of operation, as not all gas generation plants 
are equally efficient. the marginal cost of gas 
generation for an individual generator depends 
not only on the price of gas, but also how efficient 
that particular plant is. Aggregating individual 
marginal costs gives us a total marginal cost 
curve which looks something like Figure 3.3.29 
the very steep part of the graph occurs where 
the market gas generation reaches capacity. 
there can be no more gas generation, no matter 
what the price.
the industry marginal cost curve is basically 
the supply curve – gas generators will not 
generate at a price any lower than the marginal 
cost of production at any given quantity. As 
more gas generation takes place, more relatively 
inefficient plants are used, raising the marginal 
cost of generation.30 this is because higher cost 
Page 10 – Water is Valuable: the allocation of water and other resources in the New Zealand electricity market 
30 Recall that gas includes base 
load plants such as geothermal 
and wind that, in most 
situations, run independently 
of the spot price.
31 Base load generators include 
variable (e.g. wind) and must-
run plants (e.g. geothermal), 
which have very low operating 
costs. Peak efficiency plants 
are those that are efficient to 
run during periods of high 
demand, but not year-round. 
An example is an existing 
coal-fired plant; since the 
generator has already sunk 
costs into building the plant, it 
may as well be used. It would, 
however, be inefficient to build 
a new coal-fired plant because 
of the associated high fixed 
costs.
32 the model is calibrated to the 
2007 New Zealand electricity 
market. the simulations are 
derived from a process that 
explains inflows, which is 
estimated from inflow levels 
between July 1931 and June 
2008.
33 the upper curve shows the 
situation for inflows at the 2.5th 
percentile of the unconditional 
distribution of y; these are 
extremely low inflows. the 
lower curve is for inflows at the 
97.5th percentile, for extremely 
high inflows.
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Figure 3.4 The shadow price of water
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generators are used in production only after all 
low cost gas generation has been exhausted. the 
flattened part of the curve captures these low cost 
plants, which include base load generation and 
peak efficiency plants.31 
3.3 The marginal cost of water
the marginal cost of water is vital to answering the 
hydro generator’s store water or run generation 
question. Also known as the shadow price of water, 
it comprises the opportunity cost of using a unit of 
stored water immediately, and thereby forsaking 
future use. For both the social planner and profit-
maximising generators, at their generation levels 
there is no difference between the marginal value 
of water in generation today and in the future 
(which necessarily is an expected, rather than 
actual, value). 
In the planner’s case, if a difference exists 
then social welfare is not being maximised. the 
planner will therefore choose to create welfare 
by changing the amount of electricity generated 
today. In the independent generator’s case, a 
difference in the value of water between today 
and tomorrow means that it is not maximising 
profits. Suppose that the payoff of generation 
today exceeds the shadow price of stored water. 
Generators will choose to generate more in the 
present, raising the value of water today relative 
to the expected future value of water planned for 
use tomorrow: generation today will occur until 
the two values are equal. that is, the shadow 
price of water changes so that the opportunity 
cost of use today is the same as the value of use 
in the future.
like the electricity spot price, the shadow 
price of water changes with the time of year, 
inflow levels and water storage levels. Unlike 
the spot price, it is not a figure that can simply 
be looked up. We calculate the shadow price 
using 200 years of simulated daily data.32 the 
shadow price is determined by all characteristics 
of the electricity system, including inflows and 
demand.
the graphs in Figure 3.4 show the level of the 
shadow price depending on the season and the 
proportion of stored water to storage capacity. the 
upper curve on each graph depicts the shadow 
price where inflows are very low, and the lower 
curve for very high inflows.33 When storage levels 
are low, the gap between high and low inflows is 
narrower in spring and summer than autumn and 
especially winter. this is because inflows become 
very valuable when water is scarce but demand 
is high.
the shadow price tends to rise during winter 
and autumn, when inflows are low but demand 
is high. It tends to be lower during spring and 
summer, when the reverse is true. In spring and 
summer, stored water is less valuable, as it is likely 
to be replaced before winter season. the shadow 
price may even reach zero when inflow levels are 
especially high and reservoirs are at full capacity. 
In these situations hydro generators may run the 
water simply because there is too much of it. 
Alternatively, they may spill it, although this rarely 
occurs.
to illustrate, suppose that it is a dry year: 
inflows and water storage levels are low. 
Hydro generators are uncertain whether they 
can replenish reservoirs in the near future. 
Consequently, the shadow price of water soars 
and hydro generators will respond by cutting 
back production and eking out stored water. In 
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34 Interest rates matter where 
time is involved. Any income 
you choose to spend today 
could have been put into 
bonds, term deposits or other 
financial instruments. 
35 In fact, these diagrams are 
a convenient approximate 
description. they depict 
equilibrium outcomes, since 
generally the supply curve for 
electricity cannot be depicted 
independently of the demand 
curve. to see this, consider 
the third demand curve in the 
left diagram. If this demand 
increased, there would be 
more hydro generation in the 
trading period. the only way 
extra generation can occur 
today is if the value of stored 
water falls: thus the shadow 
price of water is affected by 
demand. the flat segment will 
generally not be flat.
Figure 3.5 New Zealand electricity market
Generation policies: two possible situations in any trading period
I Value of stored water high:
all gas used before hydro generation
II Value of stored water low:
gas then hydro then gas 
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such a case the expected value of using stored 
water in the future becomes very high, and a high 
return is required to incentivise generation in the 
current period. Electricity prices rise as a result. 
Gas generation goes some way to closing the 
gap left by reduced high generation, but it, too, 
becomes more expensive as less efficient plants 
are called into production.
We therefore see that the expected value of 
future generation (both gas and hydro) plays an 
important role in setting electricity prices today. 
this value depends on interest rates,34 all aspects 
of the electricity market, the elasticity of demand, 
generation policies and expected inflows. Our 
model builds in the expectations that embody 
these features. Being more conversant with the 
limitations faced by hydro and gas generators, we 
will now turn to the model proper.
3.4  This little generator goes 
to the spot market
Our generic market model captures the essence 
of the NZEM, although the supply curve does 
not look quite the same. the two graphs (Figure 
3.5) show what the market looks like at different 
water price levels and for different demands 
(depicted by the broken lines). In the first graph, 
the shadow price of water (ht*) is higher than 
the marginal cost of the least efficient gas plant. 
Hence gas generation occurs to its maximum 
level before hydro comes into play. In the second 
graph, it is lower. As we can see, the level of the 
shadow price has a significant effect on the supply 
of electricity and the market price reached. 
the total supply curve is the amalgamation 
of gas and hydro marginal cost curves, and 
represents the least-cost way of producing 
electricity at various quantities. the curious 
shape of the supply curve reflects the different 
cost structures of hydro and gas generators. 
the ‘curved’ part of the curve represents gas 
generators’ increasing marginal costs, whereas 
the horizontal part indicates hydro generation – 
the spot price does not change across this part, as 
it does not cost extra for more hydropower to be 
produced up to capacity.35 Finally, full capacity is 
denoted by the vertical part of the curve.
the exact position of the hydro generation 
part of the supply curve depends on the shadow 
price of water. the shadow price affects the 
pattern of generation across different levels of 
demand. Although it is not strictly correct to have 
one supply curve to more than one demand curve, 
and vice versa, we do so for illustrative purposes 
here. In these graphs, the further to the right a 
demand curve is, the higher demand is at all levels 
of generation. the right-most curve, for example, 
may arise from daily peaks.
At such high levels of demand, electricity is 
already being produced at capacity. Some users 
are ready to pay a high spot price for the electricity, 
beyond what any generator would have accepted 
to generate. All generators are paid the same spot 
price and receive ‘rent’ (excess returns which, in 
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36 In the short run, supply is fixed 
and generators cannot ‘magic’ 
up more electricity. However, 
if the rent phenomenon occurs 
repeatedly, this may induce 
plant investment in the long 
run, increasing capacity. Such 
infrastructure investment can 
be valued but is not a decision 
feature of our model.
37 the loss only occurs where 
demand is sufficiently high, and 
increases as demand increases. 
Where it does occur, it is very 
low at the 2007-calibrated 
reservoir capacity
38 So-called where hydro 
generators run river flows 
through the dynamos as they 
come.
39 We know this to be the case 
since the model is set up to 
solve the social planner’s 
welfare-maximising problem.
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Figure 3.6 Within-day electricity spot market
(A) OFF-PEAK PERIOD
(B) ON-PEAK PERIOD
the short run, cannot induce more generation).36 
this creates a loss of consumer welfare, indicated 
by the shaded triangle (as compared to more 
supply available at the price indicated by the 
horizontal part of the triangle).37 
Suppose the winter is harsh and electricity 
demand is very high. How does the level of the 
shadow price of water affect generation patterns? 
When the shadow price is higher than the marginal 
cost of the least efficient gas plant (as in Figure 
3.5’s first graph), demand and storage are such 
that hydro generators require a relatively high 
spot price in order to generate. Gas generation 
will occur up to capacity, whereupon the spot 
price leaps to match the shadow price if any 
hydro generation is to occur to meet remaining 
demand.
When the shadow price is lower than the 
marginal cost of the least efficient gas plant, gas 
generation pushes the spot price up until it is 
equal to the shadow price. At this point, hydro 
generation comes in and occurs up to capacity. If 
demand is still not satisfied at hydro capacity, the 
less efficient gas plants operate to provide for the 
remainder.
3.5 Generation patterns over time
Generators care about daily and seasonal 
generation. Demand varies according to pre-
dictable patterns over the courses of a day and 
a year, influencing how gas and water resources 
are allocated. We want to compare generation 
in the daily and seasonal markets, and how this 
varies depending on whether or not water storage 
is available. For simplicity we use the terms run-
of-river world38 (no storage) and reservoir world 
(storage available). It is essential to note that 
demand does not change with the availability of 
storage facilities.
High inflow periods do not necessarily 
coincide with high demand periods, so water 
storage is essential to the efficient allocation 
of water resources in the electricity market. 
Reservoirs allow hydro generators to divert high 
inflows into high demand periods, producing 
socially optimal outcomes.39 It also enables the 
efficient substitution of gas and water between 
the different timeframes (also known as inter-
temporal fuel substitution).
3.5.1  The daily spot market
Daily generation is split into on-peak (high 
demand) and off-peak (low demand) periods. 
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Figure 3.7 The hydro generator’s mismatch problem42
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40 Spot prices are accorded 
different weights according 
to trade volume at that time of 
day. For example, the spot price 
at 2 am has a lesser weight 
than that at 5 pm because less 
electricity is being exchanged.
41 there is also an issue in the 
timing of the use of stored and 
contracted gas that our model 
does not consider.
42 the data in the graph is 
normalised. Actual figures for 
demand and inflow levels have 
been divided over the average. 
this shows the percentage by 
which the figures deviate from 
the average level. For example, 
in July inflow levels are typically 
at 81% of the average level.
Waking up in the morning, popping some bread 
in the toaster and switching on the kettle for tea 
contributes to on-peak demand. Off-peak periods 
occur at times like two in the morning, when most 
people are asleep.
Figure 3.6 indicates how gas and hydro gen-
eration is distributed over the course of a day. the 
darker parts of the graphs depict the reservoir world 
and the lighter parts depict the run-of-river world. 
the vertical axis on each histogram gives the 
frequency of results obtained from the simulated 
200 years. the horizontal axes on the hydro and 
gas graphs give the respective levels of generation, 
while on the spot price graphs they give the load-
weighted price level.40 For example, in the first 
(off-peak) hydro graph, the level of generation 
with storage available was 10 units about 4% of 
the time; without storage 10 units were hardly 
ever generated.
For comparative purposes, it is simplest to 
begin with the run-of-river world. In this world, 
hydro generation levels stay fairly constant over 
on- and off-peak periods, as the inflow levels that 
dictate generation tend to change little over a day. 
Gas generation levels, on the other hand, pick 
up significantly during on-peak periods. this is 
necessary to meet the heightened demand. As gas 
generation rises, more high cost plants are put into 
production and consequentially the spot price rises.
Increased high cost gas generation raises the 
on-peak spot price. Since it is the highest cost 
plant that is the price setter, the spot price is also 
subject to changes associated with the inflow 
level on a particular day. Where there is a severe 
drought, gas generation must be expanded.
the introduction of reservoirs changes 
generation distribution dramatically. Off-peak 
hydro generation falls while on-peak generation 
rises, as hydro generators are able and prefer to 
store water for the high demand period. low-cost 
gas generation replaces hydro generation in the 
low demand period, pushing the off-peak spot 
price up. Hydro generation supplants high-cost 
gas generation in the high demand period, which 
pushes the on-peak spot price down.
Essentially, the availability of storage enables 
the redistribution of water over time.41 this 
enhances welfare and results in a lower average 
spot price, which varies little through the course 
of the day. the off-peak price is higher, while the 
on-peak price is lower, than in the run-of-river 
world.
Waking up in 
the morning, 
popping some 
bread in the 
toaster and 
switching on 
the kettle for 
tea contributes 
to on-peak 
demand. Off-
peak periods 
occur ... when 
most people are 
asleep.
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Figure 3.8 Inter-season electricity spot market
(A) SPRING
(B) SUMMER
(C) AUTUMN
(D) WINTER
3.5.2  The seasonal spot market
the seasonal market is slightly more complex than 
the daily one, because inflow levels vary across 
seasons. this creates a mismatch problem for the 
hydro generator, as illustrated in Figure 3.7.
Demand for electricity peaks in winter and is 
at its lowest in summer,43 whereas the opposite 
is true for inflow levels (that is, the inputs into 
supply). the availability of sufficient water storage 
solves the mismatch problem, as it allows hydro 
generators to run inflows and supply electricity in 
sync with demand levels.
Figure 3.8 tells us about seasonal generation. 
Again, the shaded parts refer to a world with 
43 Summer demand has 
been on the rise as more 
people use air conditioners. 
However, New Zealand’s 
summer electricity use is 
still low relative to other 
countries.
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44 the only situation where 
summer hydro generation runs 
at full capacity is where storage 
facilities are full and inflows are 
unusually high – in which case 
generators may as well run the 
water through the dynamos.
45 the electricity market model 
assumes that the shadow price 
of water remains constant 
within a day.
storage, and the light parts to a run-of-river 
world.
We begin again with a run-of-river world. 
Hydro generation reaches higher levels in spring 
and summer, consistent with high seasonal inflows. 
In contrast, winter and autumn hydro generation 
is low. As in the daily market, where less hydro 
generation occurs, there is more gas generation, 
and vice versa. the no-storage spot price shifts 
dramatically across seasons. Once again, inflow 
variation creates considerable variation in the 
price. When inflow levels are especially low, 
increasingly inefficient gas plants are called to 
operate, driving up the spot price.
When storage facilities come into the picture, 
hydro generators reduce summer production to 
store away inflows for winter use. In a reservoir 
world, summer hydro generation rarely reaches 
full capacity even during daily on-peak period.44 
When winter rolls around, hydro generators 
operate at or near full-capacity during on-peak 
periods, unless storage levels are very low. the 
graphs show that hydro generation distribution 
in any given season is more concentrated. With 
reduced fluctuation in hydro generation levels, 
there is much less inter-season variation in the 
spot price.
As is the case with daily operation, storage 
facilities enable a competitive electricity market 
to trade increased low-cost gas generation during 
low demand periods for decreased high-cost gas 
generation during high demand periods. the 
only difference is that the timescale involved 
in seasonal generation is larger. Both daily and 
seasonally hydro reservoirs influence the spot 
market to enable greatly improved efficiency 
outcomes for the electricity market. 
3.5.3 Volatile prices
the 200 years of simulation produces spot 
market price volatility similar to that of NZEM. 
the volatility is apparent from the spread of 
prices in the daily and seasonal diagrams. the 
price volatility comes about because demand 
within trading periods is relatively unresponsive 
to trading period price, and there are various 
climatic and other factors that affect demand and 
supply within a trading period. We have also 
seen that variation in inflows feeds through the 
shadow price of stored water to spot prices of 
electricity.
We have not yet considered the welfare 
(equivalently efficiency) effects of volatility 
per se. these are squarely relevant to hedging 
arrangements which we consider below in section 
3.6. the variations of market infrastructure 
and climate change considered in this section 
and  in section 4 all affect the volatility of prices; 
sometimes quite dramatically. 
3.6 Infrastructure change: 
relaxing constraints
So far we have looked at how the shadow price 
of water affects water allocation between ‘today’ 
and ‘tomorrow’, and how the availability of 
storage facilities affects allocation within a day and 
throughout the year. Now we ask how allocation 
changes if we relax some of the constraints faced 
by generators: namely, reservoir capacity, hydro 
generation capacity and the level of base load 
generation.
3.6.1  Increase in reservoir capacity
At first blush, increased storage capacity seems 
like good news for both producers and consumers. 
the actual result may be surprising. An expansion 
in reservoir capacity has little effect on within-day 
prices, but a significant effect on seasonal prices. 
Since inflow levels remain fairly constant through 
the course of a day, a small amount of capacity 
sufficiently facilitates daily fuel substitution.45 On 
the other hand, far more capacity is required to 
transfer large amounts of water from summer to 
winter.
A larger reservoir capacity also lowers the 
average cost of meeting demand by increasing the 
ability of hydro generators to shift water between 
time periods. this increases consumer welfare 
overall, but because the spot market produces 
a uniform-price, producer welfare falls. the 
lowered cost of production translates to a lower 
market-clearing price. All operating generators 
sell at the new lower price, but the amount of 
electricity being produced does not change.
Here is the surprise: generators benefit from 
the use of high-cost gas plants during high demand 
periods, for the spot price is set at these higher 
marginal costs. this applies to all hydro and infra-
... generators 
benefit from 
the use of 
high-cost gas 
plants during 
high demand 
periods, for the 
spot price is set 
at these higher 
marginal costs.
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marginal gas producers because of the unit-price 
auction feature of the NZEM. thus an increase in 
reservoir capacity is detrimental to generators, 
since it reduces the use of the highest-cost plants, 
lowering their average profit flow. On the other 
hand, this is more than offset by an increase in 
average welfare flows to consumers, leading to a 
rise in total welfare.
3.6.2  Increase in hydro capacity
Hydro generators often run close to full capacity 
in winter. An expansion in hydro capacity enables 
increased hydro generation in winter. Although 
this causes the average summer spot price to rise 
because of inter-seasonal substitution, this is more 
than offset by a lower average winter spot price.
Overall, increased hydro capacity increases 
consumer welfare at the expense of producers, 
since a lower average spot price applies across 
the board for generators. the net effect is a minor 
rise in total welfare.
3.6.3 Increase in base load generation
Suppose that more base-load and efficient peaking 
plants were added into the mix.46 With more 
low cost gas generation units in the market, the 
average level of water storage falls considerably. 
there is much less inter-season fuel substitution, 
as hydro generation is used less as a gas substitute 
in winter. the benefits of substituting increased 
low-cost gas generation in summer for decreased 
high-cost gas generation in winter decline, 
because gas plants are more homogeneous.
Producer welfare increases, as there is no 
change to the level of spot prices, but more 
electricity is being produced. Consumer welfare 
actually falls a small amount. there is a widened 
spread between average summer and winter 
spot prices, so the reduced inter-season fuel 
substitution raises the profits of both hydro and 
infra-marginal gas generation, leaving consumers 
worse off. total welfare rises. 
46 this has the effect of moving 
out the total marginal cost 
curve; that is, the cost of gas 
generation falls for each level of 
output.
Water is valuable: the allocation of water and other resources in the New Zealand electricity market  – Page 17
4 Climate change and the spot market
Climate change is one of the key issues that have 
dominated political discourse in recent years. In 
the context of hydro generation climate change 
can affect inflow variance, average levels (mean) 
and the speed at which they return to the norm 
(reversion). All of this has implications for generator 
behaviour, spot prices and social welfare. We 
examine how potential climate change may affect 
electricity prices through consideration of five key 
scenarios, as follows. 
4.1 Reduction in average inflows 
Imagine that New Zealand is becoming more 
arid and reservoirs are receiving lower average 
inflows.47 this will ease storage system pressure 
(since storage capacity is usually reached in 
winter), and hence inter-temporal fuel substitution 
increases. there is a greater spread between 
winter/summer and on/off-peak generation in 
hydro generation, and a decreased spread in 
gas.48 two things will happen to the electricity 
spot price: the gap between seasonal prices falls 
while the average price rises.
Since hydro generators have less ‘fuel’ to 
produce with, high cost gas generation increases. 
this pushes up the average spot price through 
the use of extra, less efficient plants. Hydro and 
infra-marginal gas generators benefit from the 
increased spot price to the significant detriment 
of consumers. Overall, there is a substantial 
decrease in total welfare.
4.2 Weaker seasonal variation
New Zealand already has a comparatively 
temperate climate, but in this scenario we take 
seasonal variation a step further. Inflows are 
subject to weaker variation – the difference is 
less marked between average summer and winter 
inflows. With reduced variation, hydro generators 
store less summer inflows, and inter-season fuel 
substitution falls. Any potential increase in storage 
capacity becomes less valuable. 
there is greater spread between daily on- 
and off-peak hydro generation and a smaller gas 
spread. Conversely, there is decreased inter-
seasonal hydro spread, because of increased 
winter inflows. total welfare changes little: there 
is only a small increase in consumer welfare, and 
a small decrease in producer welfare for hydro 
generators. 
4.3 Reduction in predictability 
of inflows
When inflow levels become more unpredictable 
the ability of generators to plan for the future is 
compromised. Increased short run volatility leads 
to increased long run variability. However, to 
isolate the effects of the former, in this scenario 
we reduce inflow predictability without varying 
average inflows, i.e. yearly supply of water does 
not change.
Volatile inflow levels create greater potential 
for very large inflows. this places pressure on 
the market’s ability to store water and increases 
the value of extra storage capacity.49 less inter-
temporal fuel substitution occurs. Within a 
day there is a larger spread between on- and 
off-peak hydro production. Inter-seasonally, 
there is a smaller spread, because of increased 
winter inflows. the opposite is true in each case 
for gas. Overall, the result is a minor increase 
in consumer welfare, and a minor decrease in 
hydro welfare – netting out to negligible change 
in total welfare.
4.4 Increase in mean reversion rate
We know that in the short-term unusual inflow 
levels return to the norm. the mean reversion rate 
refers to how quickly this takes place. In a changed 
scenario, we combine an increased mean reversion 
rate with decreased inflow predictability, so that 
in the long run inflow variance is unaffected.
An increased mean reversion rate reduces 
the use of water storage and significantly reduces 
inter-temporal fuel substitution. there is only a 
minor change in the value of expanded storage 
capacity. On a daily basis there is less spread 
between on- and off-peak hydro generation 
levels. Seasonally speaking, the spread is larger. In 
both cases the opposite is true for gas generation 
levels. there is little change in total welfare, as a 
small increase in consumer welfare and a small 
47 In fact, NIWA suggests a likely 
future for New Zealand in 
which inflows increase as a 
result of climate change. the 
effect of this can be inferred 
from our results of a decrease 
in average inflows. See: 
“Climate Change Projections 
for New Zealand” NIWA. 
Accessed at https://www.
niwa.co.nz/sites/default/files/
ipcc_04_nz.pdf.
48 the spread is the difference 
between the average values 
of two periods. For instance, 
where the average level of 
generation is 100 units in 
winter and 120 in summer, the 
spread is 20.
49 It is less so if we also increase 
the mean reversion rate, 
which we examine in the next 
scenario.
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decrease in producer welfare work against each 
other.
4.5 Introduction of a carbon tax
In 2005 the Fifth labour Government mooted 
a carbon tax as a way of controlling carbon 
emissions in New Zealand and as a response to 
climate change and global warming. Although an 
official carbon tax was never enacted, our current 
Emissions trading Scheme (EtS) is an analogous 
scheme. the EtS effectively fixes the price of 
carbon, but does not constrain generators in how 
much carbon they produce – they are able to 
purchase carbon credits as required.
In the context of the electricity market, a 
carbon tax or EtS targets gas generators by 
increasing the marginal cost of gas generation. 
this decreases the level of gas generation at any 
given price. Meanwhile, there is little or no extra 
hydro generation to pick up the slack, since the 
effect of the tax is to increase the shadow price 
of water. Average hydro generation does not 
change very much, but is less used in winter. this 
raises the post-tax price of electricity, reducing 
consumer welfare. On the other hand, producer 
welfare rises, due to the uniform-price auction 
effect. the overall effect is a drop in total welfare.
Climate change is a tricky beast, and we 
have visited only a few of the possible changes 
that it could induce (or in the case of carbon tax, 
effectively has induced). Although in some cases 
climate change increases producer welfare, we 
assume that generators and retailers are risk-
averse and are concerned about decreases as 
well – they prefer to keep profits relatively stable 
over time rather than experiencing great ups and 
downs. Gentailing, or vertical integration of retail 
and generation, is one way to achieve this goal, 
cutting out the go-between that is the spot market. 
Another method is to take out hedge contracts, so 
it is to the hedge market we will now turn. 
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5 the hedge market50
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Figure 5.1 Hedging into the future
50 this section draws on Chapter 
6 of Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza 
de Braganca (2011) “Essays 
on the interaction between 
risk and market structure 
in electricity markets”. PhD 
thesis, Victoria University of 
Wellington; as well as Evans, 
Guthrie and lu op. cit. 
51 It is commonly assumed that 
while individuals are risk 
averse, firms can be taken 
to be risk neutral because 
their (risk averse) owners can 
diversify (i.e. manage their 
own risk). Even if firms had a 
neutral attitude to risk, they 
still may wish to manage risk 
by hedging (e.g. to avoid costs 
of bankruptcy). Further, there 
may be other strategic reasons 
for hedging. We assume that 
risk aversion on the part of 
generators and retailers is their 
reason for entering hedge 
contracts.
the hedge market is both alternative and 
complementary to the spot market. While all 
physical flows of electricity go through the spot 
market, financial flows encompassing the price 
paid for electricity also take place in the hedge 
market. together, the two markets produce 
wholesale electricity prices and the retail prices 
charged to final consumers. In this section, we look 
at how inflows and all the other factors guiding 
spot price offering decisions affect participation in 
the hedge market.
Our analysis of the hedge market is 
underpinned by some key assumptions. We treat 
long term financial contracts for the exchange 
of electricity as hedge arrangements that fix the 
electricity price for certain periods of time and 
certain quantities of electricity. We take hedges 
between retailers and generators as having a 
similar effect to vertical integration between them. 
We attribute the demand and supply of hedges 
to be driven by volatility in the spot price – both 
its short term volatility and its future volatility and 
likely general level in the long term. We treat 
generators and retailers as though they are risk 
averse and use hedges to mitigate the volatility of 
prices received for generated energy. 51 
5.1  The spot-hedge link
Figure 5.1 elaborates the relationship between 
the markets. Generators and retailers agree upon 
hedge prices today to protect themselves from 
spot price fluctuations over some future period, 
whether that is for the next few months, or a year 
or more. therefore, all the characteristics that 
determine future spot prices have bearing on 
today’s hedge prices. Participants can also use 
past and current information to form expectations 
about the level and variation of future spot prices, 
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52 Ignoring volatility and 
transmission costs, the 
generator would generate 
100MWh (or 200MWh for a 
single half-hour trading period) 
and be unconcerned about the 
spot price for this amount of 
electricity.
53 In fact, it will be the aggregate 
effect of widespread hedges 
in a competitive market that 
affects the spot price. 
54 Paul Nillesen (2008) The Future 
of Electricity Distribution 
Regulation: Lessons from 
International Experience.  
the Netherlands, Ridderkerk: 
Ridderprint, at 149-150.
55  New Zealand Herald (18 
October 2001) “On Energy 
to delist today”, New Zealand 
Herald http://www.nzherald.
co.nz.
56 Here is an example. the 
generator Angry Inflows 
contracts to sell 100MWh in a 
trading period to Positive Energy 
by means of a hedge called a 
contract for differences (CFD). 
Angry Inflows and Positive 
Energy agree to a strike price of 
$50 per MWh. If the spot price 
is $70, Angry Inflows gets $70 
from the gross pool but has to 
rebate the $20 difference to 
Positive Energy. If the spot price 
is $30, Angry Inflows gets $30 
from the pool and $20 from 
Positive Energy (who paid $30 to 
the pool). this way, the price per 
MWh is held at $50 no matter 
the spot price. In the relevant 
future half hour trading periods, 
Angry Inflows offers in the spot 
market 200MWh for a price low 
enough to guarantee generation. 
Angry Inflows is guaranteed the 
contract price for 100MWh, but 
must ensure that the electricity 
gets transmitted. For generation 
volumes over 200MWh, Angry 
Inflows will receive the spot price 
for the additional generation. For 
generation amounts less than 
200MWh in a trading period, it 
will have to purchase the balance 
from the spot market to fulfil the 
CFD. 
as discussed in the context of water inflows 
earlier. 
Prospective spot prices clearly affect hedge 
arrangements. What is less obvious is that 
existing hedge arrangements affect today’s spot 
prices to some extent. A hedge arrangement for 
100 Megawatt Hours (MWh) for each trading 
period for 2013, for example, effectively removes 
100MWh from the spot market pricing process.52 
this will alter offers and bids in the electricity 
market and thereby affect prices.53 
New Zealand generators are required by law 
to place all their offers of physical generation into 
the spot market, but they are free to enter bilateral 
hedge contracts. the electricity hedge contract is 
a purely financial arrangement. A hedge contract 
is about future delivery of the commodity, but the 
generator cannot store the required electricity in 
a barrel until the time comes. Nor can it point to a 
particular quantity of electricity running through 
the network the following month and say to the 
buyer, “there you go, I produced that for you.” 
Instead retailers and generators use hedges to 
fix the price of electricity for an amount actually 
transmitted through the spot market. 
It is particularly important for retailers to 
hedge, since they hold retail contracts with 
households and businesses. these contracts 
specify a particular price that must be held for a 
period of time, over which the spot market price 
could change markedly. Retailers will hedge 
the amount of electricity demanded by end 
consumers, or else risk purchasing wholesale 
electricity at a high spot price and selling it on at 
a lower contracted price. take the example of the 
short-lived retailer On Energy, which launched 
and delisted in the same year. the company failed 
to hedge sufficiently before an especially dry 
winter and was subject to extremely high spot 
prices.54 By August 2001, it had exited the retail 
sector and sold off its 418,000 strong customer 
base to its competitors.55
A common type of hedge contract in the 
electricity market is the contract for differences 
(CFD).56 Parties to a CFD agree on an electricity 
strike price. If the spot price differs from the strike 
price, one party pays the other the difference. 
If the strike price averages out to be the same 
as the spot price over the life of the contract, 
no party ends up profiting at the expense of the 
other. Vertical integration of generation and retail, 
producing gentailers, is a hedging arrangement 
with similar effects, where a strike price is a price 
internal to the gentailer.
5.2 Modelling the spot and 
hedge relationship
In modelling the relationship between the spot 
and hedge markets, we assume a lack of complete 
markets. this term refers to the situation where 
there is a competitive market for every good and 
service. In relation to financial markets, this would 
mean that there are contracts to insure against all 
possible adverse events. this inevitably does not 
play out very well in the real world. It would take 
a superhuman to write a complete contract—not 
to mention such a contract would cover events as 
outlandish as intergalactic warfare or the kidnap 
of all plant employees.
We make the common presumption that 
market participants are risk averse. they want to 
achieve a balance in minimising exposure to the 
risks of the spot market, while maximising profits. 
there being no complete insurance contracts, 
hedging is a way to mitigate risk. 
the timeline (Figure 5.2) illustrates the 
decision-making processes of generators (sellers) 
and retailers (buyers) in hedging. these decisions 
are guided by forward-looking expectations 
of future markets, as well as current and past 
information. Spot market decisions are made 
every half hour, with the hedge market settled 
well in advance of spot market participation. 
A participant can be on different points of the 
timeline at once. For instance, a generator may be 
making a hedging decision based on a future spot 
market, while making an offer into a present spot 
market.
At midday on January the 31st, our arbitrary 
start point, generators decide on a desirable list of 
hedge amounts and prices they would be prepared 
to supply at, while retailers decide on a schedule 
for what they would like. the overarching goal of 
any participant is to manage its risk in a way that 
maximises its expected utility of future profit. 
this last phrase is like an oversized cookie – it is a 
mouthful but can be broken into bits quite easily. 
Expectation, or anticipation, is essential since 
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participants are looking at future possibilities. 
‘Utility’ indicates that market participants are 
taken to care about risk: in particular, they are risk 
averse rather than risk neutral. 
the hedge supply and demand schedules 
result from market participant expectations about 
the future spot market and their reasoning back to 
31 January accordingly.57 the quantity and price 
of hedges demanded or supplied depends on a 
number of factors: how risk averse the participant 
is, the spot market share it enjoys,58 and the mean 
and volatility of future spot prices. When all 
participants have made their hedging schedules 
trading occurs and the hedge market clears 
setting the market quantities and strike prices for 
hedges. 
the next step in time reveals supply-side 
information – less esoterically, inflows gush into 
reservoirs. Generators learn how much they can 
produce, and from the hedging positions they have 
chosen, they have also decided what prices they 
are willing to accept before they do so. Existing 
hedges decrease the interest that generators have 
in the spot market. Generators will offer in at a low 
spot price to ensure that they will be selected for 
generation and will meet their hedging volume 
(which they receive the strike price for). Beyond 
that volume, supply may require a spot price 
which is different from the strike price.
Next, participants discover information 
relevant to electricity demand. In the short term, 
this is the temperature. Once the demand-side 
information is revealed, retailers will then demand 
the amount of electricity as required by their retail 
contracts.59 
Once generators and retailers have made 
their respective spot market decisions, the central 
operator collates the supply and demand curves 
and determines a market-clearing electricity spot 
price and quantity. Recall that the market price is 
the one that is received by all operating generators 
for all units of generation used. the spot market 
clears, and the next trading period begins.
the whole point of engaging in the hedge 
market, as stressed, is to manage risk. the risk takes 
two forms: one is the level of the future spot price, 
while the other is the volatility of the spot price in 
the future. Both are risks for decisions taken today: 
be they about hedging, or supply or demand 
related investments in the electricity market. 
the ‘available information’ timeline shows 
that climate is an important area of risk. After 
all, electricity supply draws on natural resources 
which are inherently volatile. Participants will 
57 this means that all the factors 
that affect the spot price will 
affect hedges (and prices 
charged to retail consumers). 
these factors include: water 
inflow characteristics, demand, 
storage capabilities, input 
prices, characteristics of hydro 
and non-hydro generation, and 
so forth.
58 Retailers with a large share of 
the spot market have particular 
cause to hedge. there is 
a trade-off for generators: 
reduced risk from hedging 
comes with reduced spot 
market power (if any existed) 
because the hedged amount is 
essentially removed from the 
spot market. 
59 In our model, the retailers have 
a given share of market. 
Figure 5.2 Hedge markets in action
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therefore, where possible, wait for climatic 
information to become available, to better guide 
their decision-making.
What happens when the information involves 
great disruption? We explored the implications of 
inflow volatility in the spot market and upon social 
welfare earlier. Given that the spot and hedge 
markets are inseparable, knowledge or even fear 
of potential disruption leads participants to take 
out long term contracts in the hedge market. It is 
the effects of climate change on the hedge market 
that we will now turn to explore.
We have established that climate change affects 
electricity spot market price levels and indicated 
that it also affects spot-price volatility. Climate 
change will also affect hedge prices and quantities. 
In this section we show the effect of the climate 
changes we have studied on hedge prices taking 
quantity as fixed.
Evaluating the climate effect is complicated 
for three key reasons: two markets are involved 
(the spot and hedge markets), each market has 
at least two classes of participants (generators 
and retailers), and prices and quantities in each 
market are affected by climate conditions. In this 
case the hedge market is of particular interest. 
to simplify matters we focus on the hedge price 
and recognise that increased spot price volatility 
will increase the supply and demand for hedges 
since retailers and generators are both risk averse. 
this increase in supply and demand produces 
an ambiguous effect on the market price and 
quantities of hedges, but for our analysis we 
assume the demand effect outweighs the supply 
effect and so an increase in volatility increases the 
price of hedges.60 We also assume that an increase 
in the future average, or expected, spot prices will 
increase the strike prices of hedges (CFDs). these 
changes are important as they feed into consumer 
prices and tariffs.
Assuming that hedges span trading periods 
so as to be long run (e.g. they are not merely a day 
ahead), then climate change affects hedge prices 
and quantities through its impact on expected 
spot levels and variation in the distant future. We 
consider the four now-familiar climate change-
induced scenarios.61
the second and third columns of Figure 
6.1 show how the spot price changes with each 
scenario. In some cases, there is significant 
change in the level and volatility of the spot price. 
the right column shows the change in hedge 
prices for a given quantity of hedges, after market 
participants adjust their expectations of future 
spot markets. Here, the hedge price is the same 
as the strike price in CFDs.62
Suppose a retailer expects the spot price 
to rise tomorrow. She will also expect that the 
supplier (generator) will insist on a higher strike 
price. If the spot price is expected to be more 
volatile in the future the demand and supply of 
hedges will increase at the same strike price. As 
mentioned, Figure 6.1 assumes that the demand 
relative to supply effect of increased volatility 
dominates and so an increase in volatility results 
in a higher price of hedges. 
A fall in average inflows leads to a dramatic 
rise in the expected spot price, which will be 
reflected in hedge strike prices. However, there 
is also a significant fall in volatility, which lowers 
hedge demand relative to supply. the effect on the 
hedge market is ambiguous. Secondly, weakened 
6 Climate change and the hedge market
60 We also assume no change 
in the quantity of hedges in 
the hedge market-trading 
outcome. Hence the welfare 
of generators and retailers 
depends upon the effects 
of climate change on hedge 
prices.
61 While we do not consider 
these here, it is possible 
to explore the effect of 
investment in electricity market 
structure on hedge prices.
62 If the strike price of a CFD 
equals its expected spot 
price, the CFD has no forward 
looking riskless profit to either 
the seller or the buyer. Hence 
expected spot price levels are 
an important determinant of 
the strike price. 
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Figure 6.1 Climate change scenarios
Expected spot price Spot price volatility Hedge price 
25% fall in average inflows + 49% - 21% ?
25% weaker seasonality in 
inflows - 1% - 2% ↓
Reduced predictability of 
inflows + 1% + 14% ↑
Increase in speed of mean 
reversion of inflows - 1% - 6% ↓
inflow seasonality leads to tiny decreases in both 
the expected spot price level and volatility in the 
spot price. Expected hedge strike prices fall, and 
demand for hedges falls. Hedge prices drop.
When inflow predictability decreases, there is 
a minor rise in the expected spot price, and a larger 
increase in its volatility. the increased risk leads to 
excess demand for hedges, which together with 
the higher expected spot price produces a higher 
hedge price. lastly, an increase in the mean 
reversion speed of inflow leads to small decreases 
in both the level of the expected spot price and its 
volatility. Hedge demand rises.
Essentially, the figure illustrates how climate 
change affects hedging parameters through 
changes in the spot price. these hedging 
parameters matter: an increase in hedge prices, 
given the quantity of hedges, affects welfare 
through its effects on generator and retailer 
investment, transaction costs63 and the cost of 
capital. Ultimately, this flows through to the price 
charged to final consumers. 
63  transaction costs are ‘side 
costs’ associated with entering 
into a market exchange, e.g. 
the time spent looking for the 
mobile phone that will provoke 
the most jealousy among your 
peers!
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You would be robbing yourself of insight if you 
saw the electricity market solely as an electricity 
market. From learning how hydro generators use 
the water shadow price to shape their generation 
decisions, we see that the electricity market, as well 
as allocating inputs such as gas, is also a market 
for water. the shadow price of water affects how 
vast quantities of water are utilised by society, 
and hence how they affect social welfare in New 
Zealand. It prices water in each of the catchments 
where there are hydro generators; and it values 
water, taking into account substitution across 
catchments through the electricity water market, 
substitution with gas as well as the demand for 
electricity (in general and in catchments). 
the electricity market, then, plays a key role 
in the management of water. that is not to say it is 
the only avenue for water management – far from 
it. though we all have a stake in the electricity 
market, we value water beyond its use in keeping 
the lights on. Water has immense cultural and 
environmental value, including for Mäori as 
tängata whenua. In addition to energy generation 
it also has value to agriculture, horticulture, 
recreation, tourism, ecology and tourism.
7.1 Whither the water?
Hydro generators derive their demand for water 
from others’ demand for electricity – they value it 
as an input into production, as well as an end good. 
We can understand this demand by thinking about 
the mismatch problem discussed in the context of 
seasonal generation: the hydro generator receives 
lower inflows when electricity demand peaks, but 
can resolve this issue by storing summer inflows 
for winter where facilities are available. that is, 
in summertime hydro generators demand in 
advance the amount of stored water they expect 
to use in winter.64 
Hydro generators are not the only ones 
concerned about the level and seasonal availability 
of water. New Zealand is host to many other 
industries which create seasonally-based derived 
demand for water – dairy farming, golf, and 
winemaking all readily spring to mind. We may 
also add intrinsic household demand for water: 
plants do not water themselves, and the car might 
be in need of a good wash.65
In the face of conflicting demands for water, 
two questions arise: what use takes priority, and 
who decides? Generally, it is desirable to leave 
resource management decisions to competing 
users, who have both the incentive, information 
and the means to allocate the resource most 
efficiently. Users bear the direct costs of inefficient 
management, of which central authorities may be 
less aware of – especially when being pressured 
by lobbyists and the threat of political capture. 
Users are also in the best position to assess how 
much they value the resource in their individual 
uses. 
All of this points to the establishment of a 
broader water market that enables substitution 
among all socially valuable uses of water. For a 
7 Water allocation more generally
64 this is an illustration of how 
supply and demand interact 
with each other: until hydro 
generators have formed 
expectations of what electricity 
demand will be in the future, 
they will not know how much 
water they should store and 
hence what future supply will 
be.
65 While writing this monograph, 
the Wellingtonian authors 
were temporarily subject to an 
outdoor water ban owing to 
the North Island drought. the 
plants indeed did not water 
themselves and the irony has 
not been lost on us.
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reasonably liquid water market to exist (no pun 
intended),66 there should be well-defined water 
rights, the private exchange of such rights and 
minimal transaction costs.67 Presently there is 
scope for water trading under the Resource 
Management Act 1991, the statute which governs 
natural resource use in New Zealand. However, 
such trading has not been widely taken up due to 
a host of legislative and non-legislative barriers.68
the key role of an effective water market 
is to allow water to travel to its most socially 
valued use, and the one that yields the highest 
net benefit to society. this use will not always 
be in the electricity market. For example, one 
formal cost-benefit analysis (CBA) undertaken 
in 2009 showed that Waikato River water was 
more socially valuable when used for dairy farm 
irrigation than hydro generation, even where 
irrigation was assumed to be a consumptive use.69 
the CBA was undertaken on a nationwide basis, 
and so captures public net benefit: private costs 
and benefits plus externalities (costs and benefits 
not directly borne by resource users).
We note the year that the CBA was 
undertaken, as the most efficient use of a resource 
of the day may not be the same in the future. to 
take a common example: a gardener may use a 
quantity of tank water to water pumpkins daily, 
but may prefer to use the pumpkin water in a few 
days to put out a small fire. this uses the same 
logic as in the within-day and between-season 
fuel substitution stories.
However we allocate water, there will be 
disgruntled parties. there was a possibility in the 
Waikato River case that allocating water to farm 
irrigation could result in a rise in the electricity 
price (albeit of negligible size).70 It is a rare 
consumer who is delighted by the thought of 
rises in the power bill. However, New Zealanders 
benefit collectively when water goes to its socially 
most highly valued use. In this example, irrigation 
increases dairy farm productivity, boosting export 
receipts and growth. this is not to be sneezed 
at, considering that dairying is New Zealand’s 
top merchandise export earner, contributing 
around 2.8% to New Zealand GDP and hence to 
household welfare.71 
7.2  No such thing as free water
the ability to take a birds-eye view is crucial. 
Suppose that the government legislated to provide 
blocks of free electricity to household consumers, 
an idea that has recently been suggested in 
the media.72 It is a very appealing thought, for 
few people are charmed by winter power bills. 
However, we quickly run back into our original 
problem: how to allocate scarce resources among 
countless uses. 
there seem to be three elements to the 
proposal: a) that water is free, b) that New 
Zealand’s electricity price has risen quickly relative 
to the rest of the world since the electricity market 
reforms starting in the 1980s, and c) that many 
electricity plants were constructed and paid for in 
the past, and hence the costs are no longer 
relevant. Each calls for deeper interpretation to 
determine their relevance. None justify the 
proposal. 
In answer to the first claim, water is not free. 
It has alternative uses over time, via storage in 
electricity, and alternative non-electricity uses. Its 
opportunity cost influences and is affected by the 
use of other natural resources, such as gas.
the second claim must relate to the price 
of electricity and not to the household cost of 
electricity, because prior to the changes of the 
1980s, households as taxpayers footed the bill for 
much of the electricity infrastructure and plants. 
therefore, the electricity price to households and 
businesses at that time did not incorporate the 
full cost of electricity production and investment. 
Now, electricity prices cover production and 
investment costs, and the industry is not cross-
subsidised by taxation. Prices before the 1980’s 
changes did not indicate the true cost of electricity 
to households.
lastly, the third claim is a common 
misconception: it ignores that water has a value of 
its own separate from the costs of infrastructure: 
it is not free, as we have shown.73 In our model, 
infrastructure was taken as free, water was valued 
and hydro generation was most assuredly not 
free. 
to maximise social benefit, the opportunity 
cost of using a resource needs to be paid by each 
66 the liquidity of a market 
refers to the ease with which 
participants can trade a good or 
service.
67 See: Evidence given by lewis 
Evans (15 October 2010) in Re 
Resource Management Act 
1991 EnvC Auckland ENV-
2009-AKl-313-000005.
68 For further reading, see: 
Hawke, Richard (May 2006) 
“Improving the Water 
Allocation Framework in 
New Zealand: Enhanced 
transfer”, Ministry of Economic 
Development Occasional Paper 
06/09. Accessed at http://
www.med.govt.nz/about-us/
publications/publications-
by-topic/occasional-
papers/2006/06-09-pdf.
69 the analysis ignored the 
historical capital cost of hydro. 
the cost-benefit analysis forms 
part of the evidence at note 47. 
Hydro generation was assumed 
to be a non-consumptive use, 
so it would be even more 
socially worthwhile to have 
irrigation downstream from 
hydro plants. that way, both 
parties are able to use the 
water.
70 Ibid.
71 Ministry for Primary Industries 
(12 December 2012) “Dairy” 
Ministry for Primary Industries. 
Accessed 12 March 2013 
http://www.mpi.govt.nz/
agriculture/pastoral/dairy.aspx.
72 Susan Edmunds (10 February 
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73 In her article, Edmunds reports 
that generators with historical 
plants (particularly hydro 
plants) revalue their assets 
according to the electricity 
price. this process is common 
in the economy. the value of 
dairy farms is determined by 
the price of milk. the more 
productive farms have higher 
valuations than other farms, 
and revaluations reflect price 
changes. For both farms and 
electricity firms, it is the price 
of electricity and milk that set 
the valuations. this is desirable 
because it sets the price for 
all firms at that price which is 
relevant for socially beneficial 
investment in expansion, or 
alternatively retrenchment. 
In neither agriculture nor 
electricity is the reverse 
relationship true – the direction 
of causality does not run from 
firm value to market prices
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user. If the user cannot pay it, then the next best 
use of the resource is socially more valuable than 
the use currently being made of it; the resource is 
not being efficiently allocated. Households, too, 
should be able to earn the opportunity cost of 
electricity and by extension, water. The view that 
households intrinsically “deserve” an electricity 
subsidy is problematic – not all households are 
poor and not all businesses are flush with cash.
The price of electricity also creates household 
management incentives for socially desirable 
uses of resources. If the price is high, households 
may invest in insulation or alternative energy 
sources, or manage heating requirements more 
smartly. Indeed, this is part of the rationale for 
the emissions trading scheme that raises the price 
of carbon emitting activity so that substitutes by 
consumers and firms are encouraged. While 
a person struggling to pay the monthly power 
bills would be understandably galled by this, to 
ignore household energy-saving incentives as 
the proposal does is no solution. Any additional 
consumption induced by the provision of free 
power, and any electricity economies that fail to 
be induced under free power will have additional 
resource costs, since they imply more generation, 
higher prices or both.
Finally, free electricity is equivalent to the 
government paying a chunk of our electricity bills. 
This is because three of the five major generators 
are state-owned.74 The idea is certainly palatable 
to some, but like the first domino being knocked 
over, it has widespread effects on the efficient 
allocation of resources. Why free electricity in 
the face of other initiatives, like education or child 
poverty? Why households and not vineyards or 
dairying?
Of course, there is also the question of how the 
government would make up the resulting shortfall 
in its books. Taxation is always an available tool, 
but raising taxes itself affects the use of various 
resources. To flog a dead horse, there is no 
such thing as truly free electricity. The electricity 
(water) market is capable of allocating water to its 
most efficient use, in times of plenty and times of 
scarcity. We should be able to justify why water in 
the electricity market should be allocated to that 
use – electricity is not intrinsically more special 
than any other use. It is preferable that we have 
pricing arrangements that encourage competing 
uses to manage water efficiently within their 
markets, in ways that reflect the value of water in 
electricity and other applications.
Whichever system of allocation is settled 
upon, there will certainly be trade-offs. The 
private trading of well-defined water rights with 
minimal transaction costs, as we have suggested, 
is socially desirable.75 
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8 Final Comment
It is hard to look out across lake Wanaka or the 
Clutha River and not feel as if our country is 
exceptionally rich in water resources. Unfor-
tunately, New Zealand is not some paradise with 
a never-ending supply of water. We ask the 
same questions as the rest of the world. Who 
do we allocate to? When and how much do we 
allocate?
the touchstone of this paper is a model of the 
NZEM market, which explains how the market is 
capable of allocating water and other resources 
in a way that maximises social welfare, within 
the bounds of the market. Various disruptions 
may alter the size of the welfare pie, but the 
smooth running of the market ensures that it is 
the largest size possible given the situation. We 
see that hydro storage and gas generation play a 
significant interactive role in the management of 
climate cycles and sudden events. 
Efficient allocation requires both spot and 
hedge markets. they combine to produce a mix 
of short and long term markets that is common for 
commodities. they provide for the evolution of 
prices and quantities of electricity that change as 
resource supplies – e.g. water and gas – change, 
perhaps in response to climate conditions. 
We all have an interest in how water is 
allocated in the wider economy. It is not enough 
to take a telescopic view of a single market, 
whether electricity or otherwise, and rest on our 
laurels happy that it is efficiently allocated in that 
market. It is, quite understandably, difficult to take 
a broader view, but the efficient allocation of water 
has profound implications for the performance of 
the New Zealand economy and social welfare.
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